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Dynamic Teams and Decentralized Control Problems
with Substitutable Actions
Seyed Mohammad Asghari and Ashutosh Nayyar
Abstract
This paper considers two problems – a dynamic team problem and a decentralized control problem.
The problems we consider do not belong to the known classes of “simpler” dynamic team/decentralized
control problems such as partially nested or quadratically invariant problems. However, we show that
our problems admit simple solutions under an assumption referred to as the substitutability assumption.
Intuitively, substitutability in a team (resp. decentralized control) problem means that the effects of one
team member’s (resp. controller’s) action on the cost function and the information (resp. state dynamics)
can be achieved by an action of another member (resp. controller). For the non-partially-nested LQG
dynamic team problem, it is shown that under certain conditions linear strategies are optimal. For
the non-partially-nested decentralized LQG control problem, the state structure can be exploited to
obtain optimal control strategies with recursively update-able sufficient statistics. These results suggest
that substitutability can work as a counterpart of the information structure requirements that enable
simplification of dynamic teams and decentralized control problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The difficulty of finding optimal strategies in dynamic teams and decentralized control prob-
lems has been well-established in the literature [2], [3], [4], [5]. In general, the optimization of
strategies can be a non-convex problem over infinite dimensional spaces [6]. Even the celebrated
linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) model of centralized control presents difficulties in the decen-
tralized setting [3], [4], [7]. There has been significant interest in identifying classes of problems
that are more tractable. Information structures, which describe what information is available
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2to which member/controller, have been closely associated with their tractability. Problems with
partially nested [2] or stochastically nested information structures [8] and problems that satisfy
quadratic invariance [9] or funnel causality [10] properties have been identified as being “simpler”
than the general problems.
In this paper, we first look at the nature of cost function and the information dynamics in
a LQG dynamic team problem. We define a property called substitutability which means that
the effects of one member’s action on the cost function and the information dynamics can be
achieved by the action of another member. Although the problem we formulate is not partially
nested, our result shows that, under certain conditions, linear strategies are optimal. We then
consider a decentralized LQG problem and show that the idea of substitutability can be used in
such problems as well. Substitutability in a decentralized problem can be interpreted as follows:
the effects of one controller’s action on the instantaneous cost and the state dynamics can be
achieved by the action of another controller. Even though the problem we formulate does not
belong to one of the simpler classes mentioned earlier, our results show that linear strategies
are optimal. Further, we provide a complete state-space characterization of optimal strategies
and identify a family of information structures that all achieve the same cost as the centralized
information structure. These results suggest that substitutability can work as a counterpart of the
information structure requirements that enable simplification of dynamic teams and decentralized
control problems.
Our work shares conceptual similarities with the work on internal quadratic variance [11],
[12] which identified problems that are not quadratically invariant but can still be reduced to
(infinite dimensional) convex programs. In contrast to this work, we explicitly identify optimal
strategies in the decentralized control problem. The interplay of information structure and cost
in relation to the complexity of dynamic team problems has also been observed for variations
of the Witsenhausen counterexample [3] in [13], [14].
A. Notation
Uppercase letters denote random variables/vectors and their corresponding realizations are
represented by lowercase letters. Uppercase letters are also used to denote matrices. For two
functions f and g and a random variable/vector X , f(X) = g(X) is interpreted as follows:
for every realization x of X , the realizations of f(X) and g(X) are equal to each other. E[·]
denotes the expectation of a random variable. For a collection of functions g, Eg[·] denotes that
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3the expectation depends on the choice of functions in g. When random vector X is normally
distributed with mean µ and variance Σ, it is shown as X ∼ N (µ,Σ).
For a sequence of column vectors X, Y, Z, ..., the notation vec(X, Y, Z, ...) denotes vector
[X⊺, Y ⊺, Z⊺, ...]⊺. The vector vec(X1, X2, ..., Xt) is denoted by X1:t. In addition, for a se-
quence of column vectors X i, i ∈ A = {α1, α2, . . . , αn}, XA is used to denote the vector
vec(Xα1 , Xα2, . . . , Xαn). The transpose and Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of matrix A are
denoted by A⊺ and A†, respectively. For two vectors X and Y , we use X ⊂v Y to denote
that X is a sub-vector of Y and X 6⊂v Y to denote that X is not a sub-vector of Y . If
A is a set, we denote the cardinality of A by |A|. Furthermore, if A = {α1, α2, . . . , αn},
we use {Bm}m∈A to denote a matrix composed of Bα1 , Bα2 , . . . , Bαn as row blocks, that is
{Bm}m∈A = [(Bα1)⊺, (Bα2)⊺, . . . , (Bαn)⊺]⊺. Similarly, {Bmk}m∈A denotes a matrix composed
of Bα1k, Bα2k, . . . , Bαnk as row blocks.
II. DYNAMIC TEAM WITH NON-PARTIALLY-NESTED INFORMATION STRUCTURE
A. Team Model and Information Structure
We consider a team composed of n members. The set M = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the collec-
tion of team members. The random vector Ξ taking values in Rdξ denotes all the exogenous
uncertainties which are not controlled by any of the members. The probability distribution of Ξ
is assumed to be N (0,Σ), where Σ is a positive definite matrix.
The information available to member i is denoted by Z i ∈ Rdiz . Member i chooses ac-
tion/decision U i ∈ Rdiu as a function of the information available to it. Specifically, for i ∈M,
U i = gi(Z i) where gi is the decision strategy of member i. The collection g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn)
is called the team strategy. The performance of the team strategy g is measured by the expected
cost
J (g) = Eg [(MΞ +NU)⊺(MΞ +NU)] (1)
where U = vec(U1, . . . , Un) and N =
[
N1 . . . Nn
]
.
The information Z i available to member i includes what it has observed and what other
members have communicated to it. We assume that Z i is a known linear function of Ξ and the
decisions taken by some other members, that is,
Z i = H iΞ +
∑
j∈M\{i}
DijU j ∀i ∈M (2)
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4where H i and Dij are matrices with appropriate dimensions. We assume that members make
decisions sequentially according to their index and that the information of member i can depend
only on the decisions of members indexed 1 to i− 1. Thus, we assume that
Dij = 0 for j ≥ i. (3)
The matrices H i, Dij, i, j ∈ M, in the information structure, the matrices M,N i, i ∈ M, in
the cost function, and the probability distribution of random vector Ξ are known to all team
members.
Following [2], we define the following relationships among team members.
Definition 1. We say that member s is related to member t and denote this by sRt if Dts 6= 0.
Further, we say that member s is a precedent of member t and denote this by s t if (a) sRt,
or (b) there exist distinct k1, k2, . . . , km ∈M such that sRk1, k1Rk2, . . . , kmRt.
We denote the set of all precedents of member t by P t. The team is said to have a partially
nested information structure if for each member t and each s ∈ P t, Zs ⊂v Zt. In other words,
whenever the decision of member s affects the information of member t, then t knows whatever
s knows. For partially nested information structure, optimal strategies can be obtained using the
method described in [2]. We will focus on teams where the information structure is not partially
nested.
Definition 2. We say (s, t) is a critical pair with respect to partial nestedness if s  t but
Zs 6⊂v Zt.
We denote the set of all members s ∈ P t for which (s, t) is a critical pair by Ct. According
to above definitions, an information structure is not partially nested if there exists t ∈ M for
which Ct 6= ∅.
B. Substitutability Assumption
We make the following assumption about the team model.
Assumption 1. For every critical pair (s, t), there exists a member k such that
1) Zs ⊂v Zk, and
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52) For every ut ∈ Rdtu , there exists a uk ∈ Rdku such that
N tut = Nkuk, (4a)
Dmtut = Dmkuk ∀m ∈M. (4b)
We refer to member k as the Substituting Member for the critical pair (s, t).
Example 1. Consider Problem 1 with the following information structure:
Z1 = H1Ξ, Z2 = H2Ξ +D21U1 (D21 6= 0, Z1 6⊂v Z
2)
Z3 = H3Ξ +D31U1 =

H1
H3
′

Ξ +

 0
D31
′

U1
Z4 = H4Ξ +D41U1 +D42U2 +D43U3
=


H1
H3
′
H2
H4
′

Ξ +


0
D31
′
D21
0

U
1 +


0
0
0
D42
′

U
2 +


0
0
0
D43
′

U
3. (5)
In this information structure, (1, 2) is a critical pair since D21 6= 0 but Z1 6⊂v Z2. Since
Z1 ⊂v Z3, the substitutability assumption may be satisfied in this example if for every u2, there
exists a u3 satisfying N2u2 = N3u3 and D42u2 = D43u3.
Remark 1. The substituting member k for the critical pair (s, t) can be the member s itself as
long as condition 2 of Assumption 1 can be satisfied.
Remark 2. In order to check condition 2 of Assumption 1, we need to verify that the column space
of the matrix

 N t
{Dmt}m∈M

 is contained in the column space of the matrix

 Nk
{Dmk}m∈M


. This
can be easily done, for instance, by projecting the columns of the first matrix onto the column
space of the second and verifying that the projection leaves the columns unchanged. Alternatively,
for each column c of the first matrix, we can check if the following equation has a solution for
x:

 Nk
{Dmk}m∈M

 x = c.
The following lemma is immediate from the theory of pseudo-inverses [15].
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6Lemma 1. If a solution uk to (4a) and (4b) exists, it can be written as
uk = Λkstut =

 Nk
{Dmk}m∈M


† 
 N t
{Dmt}m∈M

 ut.
The optimization problem is defined as follows.
Problem 1. For the model described in section II-A, given that information structure is not
partially nested and the substitutability assumption (Assumption 1) holds, find the team strategy
g = (g1, . . . , gn) that minimizes the expected cost given by (1).
C. Partially nested expansion of the information structure
In order to solve Problem 1, we will consider a partially nested expansion of the information
structure. This expansion is constructed by simply providing each team member i with the
information of members in Ci. We thus formulate the following problem.
Problem 2. Solve Problem 1 under the assumption that the information available to member i,
i ∈M, is
Z˜ i =

 Z i
ZC
i

 . (6)
Lemma 2. The information structure of Problem 2 is partially nested.
Proof. It can be easily established that Problems 1 and 2 have the same precedence relationships.
That is, j is a precedent of i in Problem 1 if and only if j is a precedent of i in Problem 2.
Further, if k is a precedent of i (in both problems), then, by construction (see (6)), Z˜ i contains
Zk.
Now, suppose that j is a precedent of i in Problem 2. To establish partial nestedness of the
information structure in Problem 2, we need to establish that Z˜j = vec(Zj, ZCj) ⊂v Z˜ i. We
already know that Zj ⊂v Z˜ i. Further, any k ∈ Cj is a precedent of j and since j is a precedent of
i, it follows that k is a precedent of i. Thus, Z˜ i must contain Zk. This establishes that Z˜j ⊂v Z˜ i
and hence the information structure in Problem 2 is partially nested.
Remark 3. The idea of considering an expanded information structure and using strategies in
the expansion to investigate optimal strategies in the original information structure has been
used before [6, Section 3.5.2], [8], [16], [17]. In some cases [6, Section 3.5.2], [8], it is shown
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7that the expansion is redundant as far as strategy optimization is concerned: an optimal strategy
is found in the expanded information structure that is implementable in the original information
structure. In [16], [17], an optimal strategy found in the expanded structure may not be directly
implementable in the original information structure but, under some conditions, it can be used
to construct an optimal strategy in the original information structure (see Section II-F). As
discussed below, our use of information structure expansion differs from both these approaches.
D. Main Results
Our main result relies on showing that we can construct an optimal team strategy in Problem
1 from an optimal team strategy in the partially nested expansion of this problem (Problem 2).
We start with the following assumption.
Assumption 2. In Problem 2 with partially nested information structure, there exists an optimal
team strategy γ0 = (γ10 , γ20 , . . . , γn0 ) that is a linear function of the members’ information and
is given as
U i = γi0(Z˜
i) = Kii0 Z
i +
∑
j∈Ci
K
ij
0 Z
j, i ∈M. (7)
Remark 4. The information available to each member of Problem 2 can be written as,
Z˜ i = H˜ iΞ +
∑
j∈M
D˜ijU j ∀i ∈M (8)
where H˜ i = {Hm}m∈{i}∪Ci and D˜ij = {Dmj}m∈{i}∪Ci . Since Problem 2 is a partially nested
LQG problem, [2, Theorem 1] shows that it is equivalent to a static LQG team problem with
the following information structure:
Zˆ i = H˜ iΞ ∀i ∈M. (9)
In particular, a linear strategy is optimal for Problem 2 iff a linear strategy is optimal for
the equivalent static team. If the static LQG team has a cost function that is strictly convex in
the team decision, then the optimal strategy of each team member is linear in the information
of this member [18]. However, the cost function of (1) is not strictly convex since N⊺N is not
positive definite. Hence, the result of [18] cannot be applied here.
According to [19], for static LQG team problems with a cost function that is convex (not
necessarily strictly convex) in the team decision, the linear team strategy γi(Zˆ i) = ΠiZˆ i for all
i ∈M is optimal if the following linear system of equations has a solution for Πi, i ∈M,
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8n∑
j=1
(N i)⊺N jΠjΣZˆj Zˆi = −(N
i)⊺MΣ
ΞZˆi ∀i ∈M (10)
where ΣZˆjZˆi = E[Zˆj(Zˆ i)⊺] and ΣΞZˆi = E[Ξ(Zˆ i)⊺]. Therefore, Assumption 2 is true as long as
(10) has a solution.
Remark 5. Since team members in Problem 2 have more information than the corresponding
members in Problem 1, it follows that the optimal expected cost in Problem 2 is a lower bound
on the optimal expected cost in Problem 1.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exist linear strategies in Problem 1, given as
U i = ΓiZ i, i ∈M,
that achieve the same expected cost as the optimal strategies in Problem 2. Consequently, the
strategies U i = ΓiZ i, i ∈M, are optimal strategies in Problem 1.
E. Proof of Theorem 1
Let γ0 := {γ10 , . . . , γn0 } be an optimal team strategy of Problem 2 as given in (7). These
strategies may violate the information structure of Problem 1 since they use some information
not available to members in Problem 1. For i ∈ M and r ∈ Ci, we say that γi0 uses Zr if
the matrix Kir0 6= 0. We define E i0 = {r : r ∈ Ci and γi0 uses Zr}. The cardinality of this
set is referred to as the number of information structure violations of the strategy γi0. Clearly,
|E i0| ≤ |C
i|.
We will use the optimal team strategy γ0 in Problem 2 to construct an optimal team strategy
in Problem 1. We will proceed iteratively. At each step of the iteration, we will construct an
equivalent team strategy for which the total number of information structure violations across
all members is one less than the previous team strategy. This iterative process, described in
Algorithm 1, can be summarized as follows: At the beginning of lth iteration, we are given a
linear team strategy γl of Problem 2. We consider members t and s such that s ∈ Ct and γtl uses
Zs. This represents an information structure violation for Problem 1. We carry out a strategy
transformation, referred to as Procedure 1 and described in detail below, to obtain a new team
strategy γl+1 which has the same performance as γ l but γtl+1 does not use Zs. Thus, the number of
information structure violations is reduced by one. The 0th iteration starts with the optimal team
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9strategy of Problem 2 as given in (7). The process terminates after l∗ =∑nj=1 ∣∣E j0∣∣ ≤∑nj=1 |Cj|
iterations at which point the number of information structure violations has been reduced to 0.
As a result, in the team strategy γl∗ , γil∗ only uses Z i (which is available to member i in Problem
1). Furthermore, γl∗ has the same performance as γ0. Therefore, the team strategy γl∗ is optimal
for Problem 1 and for each team member i, γil∗ is linear in the information of member i.
Algorithm 1
1: l = 0; (Iteration Number)
2: γ0 from (7);
3: E i0 = {r : r ∈ Ci and γi0 uses Zr}, i = 1, . . . , n;
4: for t = 1 to n
5: while |Etl | 6= 0
6: s = min{r : r ∈ Etl };
7: Find new team strategy γl+1 from γl according to Procedure 1;
8: Etl+1 := E
t
l \ {s};
9: Ejl+1 := E
j
l , j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= t;
10: l = l + 1;
11: end while
12: end for
We now describe Procedure 1 and then show that it preserves the expected cost.
Procedure 1: Given linear team strategy γl in Problem 2 and team members t and s such
that s ∈ Ct and γtl uses Zs. The set E tl = {r : r ∈ Ct and γtl uses Zr} represents the information
structure violations for member t under γtl .
The strategy of member t can be written as:
γtl (Z˜
t) = Kttl Z
t +
∑
j∈Et
l
\{s}
K
tj
l Z
j +Ktsl Z
s. (11)
According to Assumption 1, there exists a substituting member k for the critical pair (s, t).
We construct new strategies for members t and k as follows:
γtl+1(Z˜
t) = γtl (Z˜
t)−Ktsl Z
s = Kttl Z
t +
∑
j∈Et
l
\{s}
K
tj
l Z
j, (12)
γkl+1(Z˜
k) = γkl (Z˜
k) + ΛkstKtsl Z
s
= Kkkl Z
k +
∑
j∈Ek
l
K
kj
l Z
j + ΛkstKtsl Z
s
= KkknewZ
k +
∑
j∈Ek
l
K
kj
l Z
j (13)
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10
where Kkknew is derived from Kkkl and ΛkstKtsl because Zs ⊂v Zk.
At the end of the procedure, the strategies of members can be written as follows,
• For member t, γtl+1(Z˜t) = Kttl+1Zt+
∑
j∈Et
l
\{s}K
tj
l+1Z
j where Kttl+1 = Kttl and K
tj
l+1 = K
tj
l
for j ∈ E tl \ {s}.
• For member k, γkl+1(Z˜k) = Kkkl+1Zk +
∑
j∈Ek
l
K
kj
l+1Z
j
where Kkkl+1 = Kkknew and K
kj
l+1 = K
kj
l for j ∈ Ekl .
• For all other members r ∈M \ {t, k},
γrl+1(Z˜
r) = Krrl+1Z
r +
∑
j∈Er
l
K
rj
l+1Z
j = γrl (Z˜
r)
where Krrl+1 = Krrl and K
rj
l+1 = K
rj
l for j ∈ Erl .
By construction, member t’s new strategy is no longer using Zs while every other member’s
new strategy is using the same information as before. Thus, the total number of information
structure violations has been reduced by one.
To show that Procedure 1 preserves the expected cost, we need to show that the team strategy
γl+1 achieves the same expected cost as the team strategy γl. We start with the following claim.
Claim 1. Let us denote the team decision under team strategies γl+1 and γl in Problem 2 by
U
∣∣
γl+1
and U
∣∣
γl
respectively. Then,
NU
∣∣
γl+1
= NU
∣∣
γl
. (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 6. Under the team strategies γ l+1 and γl, U
∣∣
γl+1
and U
∣∣
γl
are linear functions of Ξ
and are, therefore, well-defined random vectors. The equality in (14) should be interpreted as
follows: for every realization ξ of Ξ, the realizations of NU∣∣
γl+1
and NU
∣∣
γl
are equal to each
other.
Based on Claim 1, the following equality holds for every realization of the random vectors
involved,
MΞ +NU
∣∣
γl+1
= MΞ +NU
∣∣
γl
. (15)
Consequently, the expected costs under the team strategies γl+1 and γl are identical.
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F. Discussion
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that under Assumptions 1 and 2 an optimal team strategy in the
partially nested Problem 2 that violates the information structure of Problem 1 can be transformed
into an equivalent strategy that can be implemented in Problem 1. The idea of utilizing optimal
strategies in a partially nested expansion of a team problem to construct equivalent strategies in
the original problem was used in [16] as well. We paraphrase [16, Theorem 2] below:
[16, Theorem 2]: Consider the setup of Problem 1 but without Assumption 1. Let γ0 :=
(γ10 , . . . , γ
n
0 ) be an optimal team strategy in its partially nested expansion. We will assume that
γ0 violates the information structure of Problem 11. Under this team strategy, let pi∗ be the
composite control function from Ξ to U i defined such that pi∗(Ξ) = γi0(Z i). Define functions
gi : Rdξ 7→ Rd
i
z for i ∈M as
gi(ξ) := ηi(ξ, p1∗(ξ), p2∗(ξ), . . . , pi−1∗(ξ))
:= H iξ +
∑
j<i
Dijpj∗(ξ). (16)
Suppose there exist functions r = (r1, . . . , rn) where ri : Rdiz 7→ Rdiu for i ∈M such that,
pi∗(Ξ) = ri(gi(Ξ)), ∀i ∈M. (17)
Then, [16, Theorem 2] states that r is an optimal team strategy for the original non-partially-
nested problem.
In comparing our result to [16, Theorem 2], the following key observations can be made:
1) The substitutability assumption required for our result is a condition placed on the infor-
mation structure of Problem 1 and on the parameters in the cost and observation equations
(namely, the matrices N i, Dij , i, j ∈ M). The condition required for the result in [16],
on the other hand, is a requirement that an optimal team strategy in the partially nested
expansion must satisfy. Clearly, our result and the result in [16] require conditions of very
different nature.
2) Using an optimal strategy γ0 in the expanded structure, the result in [16] constructs a
team strategy γeq for the original team problem in a manner that ensures that for each
i ∈ M, U i
∣∣
γ0
= U i
∣∣
γeq
. In contrast, the strategies constructed in our proof ensure that
1This assumption is not made in [16]. But it is clear that if γ0 does not violate the information structure of Problem 1, then
it is an optimal strategy in that problem and no further construction is needed.
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NU
∣∣
γl+1
= NU
∣∣
γl
(see Claim 1). In other words, the transformation in [16] ensures that
each member’s action U i is the same random variable under the original and transformed
strategies. In contrast, under our transformation, a member’s action may become a different
random variable but the combined effect of the team members’ actions on cost as captured
by the term NU remains unchanged.
3) We next consider the following question: Suppose we solve Problem 2 under Assumptions
1 and 2 and find an optimal team strategy2 γ0 that violates the information structure of
Problem 1. We then construct the composite control functions pi∗, i ∈M, under γ0. Then,
do there always exist functions r = (r1, . . . , rn) satisfying (17)? In other words, are our
assumptions sufficient conditions for γ0 to satisfy the conditions imposed in [16, Theorem
2]? The answer is no as the following examples demonstrate:
Example 2. Consider Problem 1 where the control actions are one-dimensional, Ξ ∼
N (0, 1), and
M = {1, 2, 3}, N =
[
0 1 1
]
, M = 1
Z1 = Ξ, Z2 = U1, Z3 = Ξ. (18)
It is straightforward to see that (1, 2) is a critical pair and that member 3 is a substituting
member for this critical pair. The information structure for the partially nested expansion
of this example is
Z˜1 = Z1 = Ξ, Z˜2 =

Z2
Z1

 =

U1
Ξ

 , Z˜3 = Z3 = Ξ. (19)
An optimal strategy in the partially nested expansion is
U1 = γ10(Z˜
1) = 0, U2 = γ20(Z˜
2) = −0.5Z1,
U3 = γ30(Z˜
3) = −0.5Z3. (20)
The above strategy results in the lowest possible expected cost of 0. The composite control
functions under the above strategy are
p1∗(Ξ) = 0, p2∗(Ξ) = −0.5Ξ, p3∗(Ξ) = −0.5Ξ, (21)
2There may be many optimal strategies. We pick one arbitrarily.
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and the functions gi defined in (16) are
g1(Ξ) = Ξ, g2(Ξ) = 0, g3(Ξ) = Ξ. (22)
It is clear that there is no function r2 : R 7→ R such that
p2∗(Ξ) = r2(g2(Ξ)). (23)
In the above example, one can easily find other optimal strategies in the partially nested
expansion that would satisfy the conditions of [16, Theorem 2]. The point we wish to make
is that for an example that meets our assumptions, there may be some optimal strategies in
the partially nested expansion that do not satisfy the conditions of [16, Theorem 2]. Our
Algorithm 1, on the other hand, works with any linear optimal strategy in the partially
nested expansion.
Example 3. Consider Problem 1 where the control actions are one-dimensional, Ξ =
Ξ1
Ξ2

 ∼ N (0,

 2 −1
−1 2

) and
M = {1, 2, 3}, N =

2 −1 −1
1 2 2

 , M =

1 0
0 1


Z1 = Ξ2, Z2 = U1, Z3 = Ξ2. (24)
It is straightforward to see that (1, 2) is a critical pair and that member 3 is a substituting
member for this critical pair. The information structure for the partially nested expansion
of this example is
Z˜1 = Z1 = Ξ2, Z˜2 =

Z2
Z1

 =

U1
Ξ2

 , Z˜3 = Z3 = Ξ2. (25)
Since this information structure is partially nested, it is equivalent to a static team with the
following information structure,
Zˆ1 = Ξ2, Zˆ2 = Ξ2, Zˆ3 = Ξ2. (26)
According to Remark 4, the linear team strategy U i = γi(Zˆ i) = ΠiZˆ i = ΠiΞ2 for i ∈ M
is optimal if the following linear system of equations has a solution for Πi, i ∈M,
10Π1 = 0, 10Π2 + 10Π3 = −5. (27)
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One solution provides the following strategies:
U1 = 0, U2 = Ξ2, U3 = −1.5Ξ2. (28)
(28) can be written as follows under the information structure of (25),
U1 = γ10(Z˜
1) = 0, U2 = γ20(Z˜
2) = Z1,
U3 = γ30(Z˜
3) = −1.5Z3. (29)
The team strategies of (29) cannot be implemented in the original non-partially-nested
information structure because U2 uses Z1 while Z1 6⊂v Z2. We now follow the procedure
of Algorithm 1 and use γ0 = (γ10 , γ20 , γ30) from (29) to find optimal team strategies that can
be implemented in the original information structure. Since there is only one information
structure violation under γ0, we obtain the desired strategies after one iteration:
U1 = γ11(Z˜
1) = 0, U2 = γ21(Z˜
2) = 0,
U3 = γ31(Z˜
3) = −0.5Z3. (30)
To compare our approach with that of [16], note that the composite control functions under
γ0 are
p1∗(Ξ) = 0, p2∗(Ξ) = Ξ2, p3∗(Ξ) = −1.5Ξ2. (31)
and the functions gi defined in (16) are
g1(Ξ) = Ξ2, g2(Ξ) = 0, g3(Ξ) = Ξ2. (32)
Clearly, there is no function r2 such that p2∗(Ξ) = r2(g2(Ξ)).
4) Under our assumptions, the strategies ΓiZ i, i ∈ M, of Theorem 1 are optimal for both
Problems 1 and 2. If these are used as γ0 in [16, Theorem 2], then it can be shown that
ri = Γi will satisfy (17). Of course, if we know Γi, i ∈M, already, then there is no need
to carry out the transformation of [16, Theorem 2].
5) Finally, [16, Problem A in Section IV] presents an example where the conditions of [16,
Theorem 2] hold, but the substitutability assumption does not. Thus, our assumptions do
not provide necessary conditions for the conditions imposed in [16, Theorem 2].
The core idea of substitutability is also conceptually different from the conditional independence
related properties of stochastic nestedness [8] and P-quasiclassical information structures [17] that
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have been used for some non-partially-nested problems. In the non-partially-nested models of [8]
and [17], one can identify an agent’s “missing information” that prevents the information structure
from being partially nested, i.e., if the agents knew their missing information, then the information
structure would be partially nested. These papers then rely on conditional independence like
properties (of the relevant cost or state variables) to argue that given an agent’s actual information,
the missing information is irrelevant for making optimal decisions. We believe that this is very
different from the essence of substitutability. Under our assumptions, it is not the case that
the missing information of agent i is irrelevant for its decision. It’s just that there is another
agent present that knows the information missing at agent i and can reproduce any effects on
cost and observations that agent i could have produced had it known its missing information.
Let’s reconsider Example 2 where the information structure is Z1 = Ξ, Z2 = U1, Z3 = Ξ.
Suppose the following strategies are being used under this information structure:
U1 = γ1(Z1) = 0, U2 = γ2(Z2) = 1, U3 = γ3(Z3) = 0. (33)
Under the above strategies, the conditional expectation of the cost terms that involve U2, given
Z2, U2, can be computed to be
E
γ
[
U2U2 + 2U2Ξ + 2U2U3 | Z2, U2
]
= 1. (34)
On the other hand, if the same expectation is computed given Z1, U1, Z2, U2, we get
E
γ
[
U2U2 + 2U2Ξ + 2U2U3 | Z1, U1, Z2, U2
]
= 1 + 2Ξ. (35)
If the information structure was P-quasiclassical, then the two conditional expectations above
should have been identical (see [17, Definition 2]). This demonstrates that Example 2 violates the
definition of P-quasiclassical information structures even though it satisfies our substitutability
assumption.
III. SUBSTITUABILITY IN DECENTRALIZED LQG CONTROL
Decentralized control problems in discrete time can be viewed as dynamic team problems by
viewing a controller’s actions at different time instants as the actions of distinct team members
[2]. Thus, a decentralized control problem with n controllers acting over a time horizon of
duration T can be seen as a dynamic team with nT members, each member responsible for one
control action. We will denote the team member corresponding to controller i’s action at time
t as member i.t. We can then verify whether this dynamic team satisfies the assumptions of
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Section II and if it does we can use an optimal team strategy in its partially nested expansion
to find an optimal team strategy in the original team. The optimal strategy for member i.t
then naturally becomes the control strategy for controller i at time t. Thus, non-partially-nested
decentralized control problems whose dynamic team representations satisfy Assumptions 1 and
2 can be solved using the analysis of Section II. It is possible, however, to exploit the state
structure in control problems to (a) simplify the verification of the substitutability assumption
and (b) to find compact control strategies with recursively update-able sufficient statistics. We
demonstrate this by considering the following problem.
A. System Model and Information Structure
We consider a decentralized control problem with n controllers where
1) The state dynamics are given as
Xt+1 = AXt +BUt +Wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (36)
where Xt,Wt ∈ Rdx , Ut ∈ Rdu and Ut = vec(U1t , . . . , Unt ).
2) Each controller makes a noisy observation of the system state given as
Y it = C
iXt + V
i
t , i = 1, . . . , n. (37)
Combining (37) for all controllers gives:
Yt = CXt + Vt, (38)
where Yt denotes vec(Y 1t , Y 2t , . . . , Y nt ) and Vt denotes vec(V 1t , V 2t , . . . , V nt ) and C is a
matrix composed of C1, . . . , Cn as row blocks.
The initial state X1 and the noise variables Wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and Vt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, are
mutually independent and jointly Gaussian with the following probability distributions:
X1 ∼ N (0,Σx), Wt ∼ N (0,Σw), Vt ∼ N (0,Σv).
The information available to the ith controller at time t is:
I it = {Y
i
1:t, U
i
1:t−1} i = 1, . . . , n. (39)
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Each controller i, chooses its action U it according to U it = git(I it). The collection gi = (gi1, . . . , giT )
is called the control strategy of controller i. The performance of the control strategies of all
controllers, g = (g1, . . . , gn), is measured by the total expected cost over a finite time horizon:
J (g) = Eg
[
T∑
t=1
(MXt +NUt)
⊺(MXt +NUt)
]
. (40)
The optimization problem is defined as follows.
Problem 3. For the model described above, find control strategy g = (g1, . . . , gn) that minimizes
the expected cost given by (40).
B. Substitutability Assumption
We make the following assumption about the system.
Assumption 3. For every vector u = vec(u1, u2, . . . , un), there exist control actions vi = li(u)
for controller i, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
Bu = B


0
.
.
.
vi
.
.
.
0


and Nu = N


0
.
.
.
vi
.
.
.
0


. (41)
We can write the B and N matrices in terms of their blocks as
B =
[
B1 . . . Bn
]
, N =
[
N1 . . . Nn
]
.
An example of a system satisfying Assumption 3 is a two-controller LQG problem where the
dynamics and the cost are functions only of the sum of the control actions, that is, (u1t + u2t ).
This happens if B1 = B2 and N1 = N2. In this case, using v1t = v2t = u1t + u2t satisfies (41).
Remark 7. More generally, Assumption 3 is satisfied iff the column spaces of matrices

Bi
N i

,
i = 1, . . . , n, are identical.
Remark 8. The substitutability assumption above (Assumption 3) is really just a compact
representation of the substitutability assumption of Section II (Assumption 1) with a specified
substituting member for each critical pair. To see this, first note that in the dynamic team
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representation of the control problem members i.s and j.t form a critical pair when j 6= i and
s < t. Secondly, member i.t knows all the information of member i.s. To show that member i.t
is a substituting member for the critical pair (i.s, j.t), we just need to argue that for any action
u
j
t , we can find an action uit that produces the same effect on total cost and future observations.
Since the effect of ujt on the cost at time t is only through the term N jujt and its effects on the
future costs and observations are only through Bjujt , it suffices to ensure that for any ujt , there
exists uit such that
N ju
j
t = N
iuit and Bju
j
t = B
iuit.
Combining the above for all j 6= i gives the substitutability conditions of Assumption 3.
The following lemma is immediate from the theory of pseudo-inverses [15].
Lemma 3. If a solution vi to (41) exists, it can be written as vi = Λiu, where
Λi =

Bi
N i


† 
B
N

 . (42)
C. A Centralized Problem
In order to solve Problem 3, we would like to consider a partially nested expansion of its
information structure. Because members i.s and j.t form a critical pair in the dynamic team
representation of the control problem when j 6= i and s < t, a partially nested expansion must
give controller j at time t all the information of controller i at any time s < t. A convenient
expansion that meets this requirement is the information structure of the centralized problem
described below.
Problem 4. For the model described above, assume that the information available to each
controller is
I˜t = {Y1:t, U1:t−1}. (43)
Controller i chooses its action according to strategy U it = git(I˜t). The objective is to select
control strategies that minimize (40).
The following lemma follows directly from the problem descriptions above and well-known
results for the centralized LQG problem with output feedback [20].
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Lemma 4. 1) The optimal cost in Problem 4 (with centralized information structure) is a
lower bound on the optimal cost in Problem 3 (with decentralized information structure).
2) The optimal strategies in Problem 4 have the form of Ut = KtZt where Zt = E[Xt|I˜t]. Zt
evolves according to the following equations:
Z1 = L1Y1
Zt+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AZt +BUt) + Lt+1Yt+1. (44)
The matrices Lt, t = 1, . . . , T can be computed apriori from the problem parameters.
D. Main results
In this section, we show that it is possible to construct optimal strategies in Problem 3 from
the optimal control strategy of Problem 4.
Theorem 2. Consider Problems 3 and 4, and consider the optimal strategy, Ut = KtZt, of
Problem 4. We write Lt+1 of Lemma 4 as Lt+1 =
[
L1t+1 L
2
t+1 . . . L
n
t+1
]
. The optimal control
strategies of Problem 3 can be written as
U it = Λ
iKtS
i
t (45)
where Λi is given by (42) and Sit satisfies the following update equations:
Si1 = L
i
1Y
i
1
Sit+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AS
i
t +B
iU it ) + L
i
t+1Y
i
t+1. (46)
Moreover, the optimal strategies in Problem 3 achieve the same cost as the optimal strategies
in Problem 4.
Observe that the strategies given by (45) and (46) are valid control strategies under the
information structure of Problem 3 because they depend only on Y i1:t, U i1:t−1 which are included
in I it . The states Sit defined in (46) are related to the centralized estimate Zt by the following
result.
Lemma 5. The centralized state estimate Zt and the states Sit defined in (46) satisfy the following
equation:
Zt =
n∑
i=1
Sit . (47)
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Proof. We prove the result by induction. For t = 1, from (44), we have Z1 = L1Y1 and according
to (46),
n∑
i=1
Si1 = L
1
1Y
1
1 + L
2
1Y
2
1 + ... + L
n
1Y
n
1 = L1Y1. (48)
Now assume that Zt =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t . We need to show that Zt+1 =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t+1. From (44), it follows
that
Zt+1 = (I − Lt+1C)(AZt +BUt) + Lt+1Yt+1. (49)
From (46), we have
n∑
i=1
Sit+1 =
n∑
i=1
[(I − Lt+1C)(AS
i
t +B
iU it ) + L
i
t+1Y
i
t+1]
= (I − Lt+1C)(A
n∑
i=1
Sit +
n∑
i=1
BiU it ) +
n∑
i=1
Lit+1Y
i
t+1]
= (I − Lt+1C)(AZt +BUt) + Lt+1Yt+1. (50)
Therefore, Zt+1 =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t+1.
Remark 9. If Xt = vec(X1t , . . . , Xnt ) and for each i Y it = X it , it can be easily shown that
Sit = vec(0, . . . , X
i
t , . . . , 0).
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. For the model described in section III-A, consider any information structure under
which the information of controller i at time t, Iˆ it , satisfies
{Y i1:t, U
i
1:t−1} ⊆ Iˆ
i
t ⊆ {Y1:t, U1:t−1},
for all i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T . Then, the optimal strategies in this information structure
are the same as in Theorem 2.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
For notational convenience, we will describe the proof for n = 2. If Ut = KtZt is the optimal
control strategy of Problem 4, then from Lemma 5, we have:
Ut = KtZt = Kt(S
1
t + S
2
t ). (51)
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We claim that the decentralized control strategies defined in Theorem 2, that is
Ut =

U1t
U2t

 =

Λ1KtS1t
Λ2KtS
2
t

 , t = 1, . . . , T, (52)
yield the same expected cost as the optimal centralized control strategies Ut = KtZt, t =
1, . . . , T .
We first consider the control system under the centralized strategies. We proceed sequentially
to establish the claim by successively changing the control strategies at each time step. Under
the control strategies Ut = KtZt, t = 1, . . . , T , the controlled system can be viewed as a linear
system with vec(Xt, Zt) as the state. We first change the control strategy at time t = 1 from
U1 = K1Z1 to the one given by (52) and show that it doesn’t change the instantaneous cost or
the future evolution of the linear system.
Under control action U1 = K1Z1, we have NU1 = NK1Z1. Under control actions U11 =
Λ1K1S
1
1 , U
2
1 = Λ
1K1S
2
1 , we have
NU1 =
[
N1 N2
]
U1 = N
1U11 +N
2U21
= N1Λ1K1S
1
1 +N
2Λ2K1S
2
1 . (53)
From the substitutability assumption (Assumption 3) and Lemma 3, for any vector u, Nu =
N iΛiu. Therefore,
N1Λ1K1S
1
1 = NK1S
1
1 , N
2Λ2K1S
2
1 = NK1S
2
1 . (54)
(53) can now be written as,
N1Λ1K1S
1
1 +N
2Λ2K1S
2
1 = N(K1S
1
1 +K1S
2
1) = NK1Z1, (55)
where the last equality is true because Z1 = S11 + S21 . Thus, the change in strategies at time
t = 1 does not affect the cost at time t = 1.
The change in strategies at time t = 1 affects the next state vec(X2, Z2) only through the
term BU1. From the substitutability assumption (Assumption 3) and Lemma 3, for any vector
u, Bu = BiΛiu. Therefore,
B1Λ1K1S
1
1 +B
2Λ2K1S
2
1 = B(K1S
1
1 +K1S
2
1) = BK1Z1. (56)
The future state evolution is unaffected by the change in strategies at time t = 1. Therefore,
changing strategies at time t = 1 from the centralized strategy to the one given by (52) does
not change the expected cost. Proceeding in the same manner for all successive time instants
establishes the claim.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered two problems, an LQG dynamic team problem and a decentralized LQG control
problem and defined a property called substitutability in these problems. For the non-partially-
nested LQG dynamic team problem, we showed that under certain conditions an optimal strategy
of each team member is linear in its information. For the non-partially-nested decentralized
control problem under the substitutability assumption, we showed that linear strategies are
optimal and we provided a complete state-space characterization of optimal strategies. Our results
suggest that substitutability can work as a counterpart of the information structure requirements
that enable simplification of dynamic teams and decentralized control problems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CLAIM 1
We want to show that the term NU is the same under the team strategies γ l+1 and γ l of
Problem 2. Under different team strategies, the information available to team members changes.
Hence, we first need to show that Z˜ i, ∀i ∈M, is the same under γl+1 and γl. If we denote the
information available to member i in Problem 2 under team strategies γl+1 and γl by Z˜ i
∣∣
γl+1
and Z˜ i
∣∣
γl
respectively, we want to show that,
Z˜ i
∣∣
γl+1
= Z˜ i
∣∣
γl
∀i ∈M. (57)
According to (6), Z˜ i is obtained from {Zr, r ≤ i}. Therefore, to show that (57) holds, it suffices
to show that
Zr
∣∣
γl+1
= Zr
∣∣
γl
∀r ∈ M. (58)
According to Procedure 1, γjl+1 is the same as γ
j
l for j ∈M\{t, k}. We, therefore, categorize
team members into two groups:
• Group 1: {r ∈M : r ≤ min{t, k}}
• Group 2: {r ∈M : r > min{t, k}}
For r in Group 1, Zr does not depend on the strategies of members t and k. Therefore, for
r in Group 1, (58) holds.
We will show inductively that for all r ≤ h, Zr is the same under γl and γl+1. For h =
min{t, k}, the statement holds because we have shown that it holds for r in Group 1.
Now, assume that for some α ≥ min{t, k}, (58) holds for all r ≤ α (induction hypothesis).
This implies that (57) also holds for r ≤ α. We now need to show that (58) holds for r = α+1.
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Suppose α + 1 > t, α + 1 > k. Under team strategy γl+1, Zα+1 can be written as
Zα+1
∣∣
γl+1
= Hα+1Ξ +
∑
j<α+1
Dα+1,jU j
∣∣
γ
j
l+1
= Hα+1Ξ +
∑
j<α+1,j 6=t,j 6=k
Dα+1,jγ
j
l+1(Z˜
j
∣∣
γl+1
)+
Dα+1,tγtl+1(Z˜
t
∣∣
γl+1
) +Dα+1,kγkl+1(Z˜
k
∣∣
γl+1
). (59)
Z˜j, Z˜t and Z˜k present in the right hand side of (59) are the same under control strategies γl
and γl+1 by the induction hypothesis. Further, for j 6= t, k, γ
j
l+1 = γ
j
l . Using these observations
and (12) and (13), (59) can be written as,
Zα+1
∣∣
γl+1
= Hα+1Ξ +
∑
j<α+1,j 6=t,j 6=k
Dα+1,jγ
j
l (Z˜
j
∣∣
γl
)+
+Dα+1,t
(
γtl (Z˜
t
∣∣
γl
)−Ktsl Z
s
∣∣
γl
)
+Dα+1,k
(
γkl (Z˜
k
∣∣
γl
) + ΛkstKtsl Z
s
∣∣
γl
)
. (60)
According to Lemma 1 and the substitutability assumption,
Dα+1,kΛkstKtsl Z
s
∣∣
γl
= Dα+1,tKtsl Z
s
∣∣
γl
. (61)
Using (61), (60) can be simplified as,
Zα+1
∣∣
γl+1
= Hα+1Ξ +
∑
j<α+1,j 6=t,j 6=k
Dα+1,jγ
j
l (Z˜
j
∣∣
γl
)
+Dα+1,tγtl (Z˜
t
∣∣
γl
) +Dα+1,kγkl (Z˜
k
∣∣
γl
) = Zα+1
∣∣
γl
. (62)
Thus, Zα+1
∣∣
γl+1
= Zα+1
∣∣
γl
if α + 1 > t, α + 1 > k. If t < α + 1 ≤ k (alternatively
k < α+1 ≤ t), we can employ arguments similar to above along with the fact that Dα+1,k = 0
(alternatively Dα+1,t = 0) to show (58) for r = α + 1.
Hence, by induction, (58) holds for all r from 1 to n. Therefore, Zr and consequently Z˜r for
r ∈M are the same under team strategies γl and γl+1.
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Now, we show that NU is the same under team strategies γl and γ l+1. Under γl+1, NU can
be written as follows,
NU
∣∣
γl+1
=
n∑
j=1
N jγ
j
l+1(Z˜
j)
=
∑
j∈M\{t,k}
N jγ
j
l+1(Z˜
j) +N tγtl+1(Z˜
t) +Nkγkl+1(Z˜
k)
=
∑
j∈M\{t,k}
N jγ
j
l (Z˜
j) +N t
(
γtl (Z˜
t)−Ktsl Z
s
)
+Nk
(
γkl (Z˜
k) + ΛkstKtsl Z
s
)
=
∑
j∈M\{t,k}
N jγ
j
l (Z˜
j) +N tγtl (Z˜
t) +Nkγkl (Z˜
k)
= NU
∣∣
γl
(63)
where the penultimate equality is true because Lemma 1 and the substitutability assumption
provide that
NkΛkstKtsl Z
s = N tKtsl Z
s. (64)
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